INTRODUCTION
Reckoning with the constitutional status of the United States' overseas territories has been a tricky business for the Supreme Court. Saddled with anachronistic doctrines left over from the turn of the twentieth century, 1 the Court has at-municipal corporations to restructure their debt obligationsbut also imposed a "Fiscal Oversight and Management Board" to review duly-enacted laws of the Puerto Rican legislature. 9 Congress cited the Territories Clause's grant of plenary power to Congress to govern Puerto Rico in enacting PROMESA. 10 This Note casts doubt on attempts by Congress to justify any law affecting Puerto Rico by citing the Territories Clause. 11 Despite the seemingly wide scope of the Territories Clause's grant to Congress of "plenary power" to govern the territories, the Supreme Court should recognize Congress's limited powers to legislate for Puerto Rico in order to give effect to both the will of Congress and the will of Puerto Ricans. Although Puerto Rico is not a state entitled to the voting rights ordinarily accorded to states, Congress chose to bind its own hands and provide Puerto Rico with quasi-sovereignty 12 functionally equal to the sovereignty retained by states. Some lower federal courts have recognized this autonomy, and so should the Supreme Court. 13 Congress did not have to make this choice; however, by delegating Puerto Rico full self-government rights in 1952 via a compact (the 1952 Compact) as opposed to a simple statute, Congress effectively tied its own hands from unilaterally altering Puerto Rico's status. In fact, Puerto Rico is the only current or former U.S. territory, including the District of Columbia, that has received full self-governance via an agreement beUnited States-Puerto Rico Relationship, 100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 79, 80-87 (2016) (discussing PROMESA and its potential effects on the relationship between Puerto Rico and the federal government).
9 § § 101-09,130 Stat. at 553-63. 10 Id. § 101(b)(2); see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (the Territories Clause).
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In fact, PROMESA may be justified by the Commerce Clause or the Bankruptcy Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 4. However, the targeted nature of PROMESA may violate the Equal Sovereignty doctrine. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2621-24 (2013) . But neither the Supreme Court nor the lower courts have applied this doctrine to strike down a federal law since the doctrine was announced. Nevertheless, the constitutionality of PROMESA is beyond the scope of this Note. tween the federal government and the people of the territory. 14 Because of Puerto Rico's state-like sovereignty by virtue of the 1952 Compact, Congress cannot unilaterally alter Puerto Rico's status. Consequently, Congress may only legislate for Puerto Rico on the authority of its non-Territories Clause enumerated powers, subject to federalism constraints implicit in the Constitution's structure. 15 The Supreme Court and the First Circuit, in dicta, have observed that the 1952 Compact abrogated Congress's plenary power to govern Puerto Rico under the Territories Clause, but no court has definitively held that Congress may not unilaterally alter Puerto Rico's status. 16 Before proceeding further, it is important to understand what this Note means when it argues that the 1952 Compact conferred "sovereignty" upon Puerto Rico. While in international law sovereignty refers to the full range of powers enjoyed by nation-states, this Note uses a more limited definition. Here, sovereignty refers only to the set of powers not delegated to the federal government in the Constitution, and thus retained by the several states. As Chief Justice Marshall noted in McCulloch v. Maryland, "[i]n America, the powers of sovereignty are divided between the government of the Union, and those of the states. They are each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the ob- 14 No other U.S. territory has gained similar sovereign status on the basis of a formal agreement with the federal government like Puerto Rico has. Although Congress has authorized the people of Guam and the Virgin Islands to pass their own constitutions, neither has successfully negotiated with Congress to achieve a compact like Puerto Rico Although the Court in Harris said Congress can legislate for "Puerto Rico" so long as there is a rational basis, that language should not be understood to contradict this Note's argument. Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651-52 (1980) (per curiam). Harris addressed a law that purportedly violated individual Puerto Ricans' rights to equal protection, not the Puerto Rican government's rights as a semi-sovereign free associated state. See id. As a summary disposition in tension with not only the 1952 Compact but also the Court's and the First Circuit's own pronouncements regarding Puerto Rico's status, the Court would do well to revisit Harris. jects committed to the other." 17 The police power is chief among the powers reserved to the states-and a power the Puerto Rican government exercises. Explicitly excluded from the meaning of sovereignty here are powers reserved to the federal government, such as the ability to conduct foreign policy. 18 Puerto Rican referenda, ultimately resulting in a constitution approved by the Puerto Rican people. 22 Second, because Puerto Rico's powers now emanate from its people, not an explicit federal mandate, Puerto Rico is the source of the island's domestic law, not the federal government. 23 Thus, Puerto Rico is not a territory within the Territories Clause's plenary power, as such power only makes sense where there is no sovereign authority. Given the presence of mutually-agreed upon sovereign authority, that authority ought to be recognized as entrenched so long as both Puerto Rico and Congress do not mutually agree to amend this status quo. Moreover, the Political Process doctrine prevents Congress from taking away political rights from minority groups once granted. Congress has never attempted to claw back any self-governance rights from U.S. territories before, and the courts should not allow that if it were to happen. 24 Finally, this Part recounts the legislative history and contemporary evidence for the federal government's intent to provide Puerto Rico with a real measure of self-governance.
Finally, Part III argues that the parties to the 1952 Compact intended it to confer "state-like autonomy" on Puerto Rico by means of free associated state status. 25 27 While the United States claimed plenary power over the island upon annexation, Spain had begun transferring more powers to Puerto Ricans shortly before the Spanish-American War. Prior to the war's outbreak, Puerto Ricans had representation in the Spanish Parliament and their own bicameral legislature. 28 Only this "Insular Parliament" could legislate for the island; the Spanish Crown, through the Royal Governor, only retained veto rights. 29 Hence, prior to the Treaty of Paris, Puerto Rico arguably had more self-governance than British, Dutch, or French overseas possessions such as Canada, as those colonies did not receive representation in national parliaments, and national parliaments legislated for those colonies. 30 That state of affairs immediately changed after annexation. Initially, the United States imposed military rule before passing Puerto Rico's first Organic Act in 1900 (the Foraker Act), which set up a civil government for the island. 31 The Foraker Act provided for a bicameral legislature, courts, and a governor. 32 The federal government appointed all officials, save members of the lower legislative house. 33 The Foraker Act did not guarantee Puerto Rico the full slate of rights guaranteed by the Constitution and immediately received challenges in the federal courts. 34 In The Insular Cases, here used to refer to the six cases heard by the Supreme Court in 1901 regarding Puerto Rico, the Court upheld the Foraker Act. 35 The Court distinguished between incorporated territories, those destined for statehood, and unincorporated territories, which were not. 36 In unincorporated territories only certain constitutional rights applied by default, and the federal government could choose to extend, or not, the rest. 37 The 41 In the midst of worldwide decolonization following World War II, Puerto Rico demanded further political rights from the federal government. 42 The federal government initially responded by allowing Puerto Ricans to elect the island's governor. The President, however, retained the right to appoint Puerto Rican Supreme Court Justices and certain members of the Puerto Rican executive branch. 43 This move failed to satiate Puerto Rican demands for self-government, not to mention "pressure from the United Nations to end colonialism." 44 In response to this pressure, the United States represented to the United Nations when signing the United Nations Charter that it "would 'develop self-government'" in its territories. 45 1948 the Puerto Rican government held a popular referendum on the island's future. 46 The referendum provided three options for Puerto Ricans to choose from: independence, statehood, or associated, autonomous "commonwealth" status. 47 The third option won handily. 48 The referendum's ramifications sorted themselves out over the course of four years. Congress took no action in response to the referendum until 1950 when it passed Public Law 600, authorizing the people of Puerto Rico to draft their own constitution. 49 Public Law 600 also repealed the existing federal governance framework, except for the provision that Puerto Rico had to respect nationally applicable federal laws. 50 Congress also made the repeal of the federal governance framework contingent on the Puerto Rican Constitution's ratification by both the people of Puerto Rico and Congress. In this scheme, Congress "fully recogniz[ed] the principle of government by consent" and adopted Public Law 600 "in the nature of a compact" between the federal government and the people of Puerto Rico. 51 Puerto Ricans convened a constitutional convention and ratified a constitution in 1952. 52 
A. The Text & Effectiveness of the Compact
Congress's authorizing legislation, Public Law 600, conditionally transfers state-like sovereignty to Puerto Rico. First, the whereas clauses situate the bill within Congress having "progressively recognized the right of self-government of the people of Puerto Rico." 55 Next, noting that "an increasingly large measure of self-government has been achieved," Congress, "fully recognizing the principle of government by consent," authorized Puerto Ricans to adopt their own constitution and organize their own republican form of government. 56 This language demonstrates Congress's desire to effectuate full selfgovernment in Puerto Rico. Accordingly, Congress made clear that because the bill was "in the nature of a compact," Puerto Rico needed to vote to agree with the bill's terms, and Congress and the President would have to approve the Puerto Rican Constitution. 57 Thus, the effectiveness of the remainder of the bill's provisions, repealing the parts of the organic acts governing Puerto Rico, was contingent on the outcome of this treaty-like negotiation between the federal government and the Puerto Rican people.
Furthermore, Congress did not contemporaneously assert its unconstrained authority to legislate for Puerto Rico. Whereas previously Congress established a government for Puerto Rico via an Organic Act enacted in the U.S. Code, afterward nothing in the U.S. Code provided for the exact form of Puerto Rican self-government. 58 The former Puerto Rican Organic Act has been reduced to the Federal Relations Act, which merely provides that "[t]he statutory laws of the United States not locally inapplicable . . . shall have the same force and effect in Puerto Rico as in the United States, except the internal revenue laws." 59 This necessarily raises the question whether the federal government had the power to so bind itself to an agreement with a non-U.S., non-foreign state entity. On this reading, the 1952 Compact is a farce-nothing but a revised delegation of powers to a federal agency, the Puerto Rican government, which might be revised at any time. However, the First Circuit, the circuit responsible for appeals from the Puerto Rican federal district court, has rejected this argument. In United States v. Quiñones, the court observed that because of the 1952 Compact: cited with approval its prior case, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing, which espoused the notion that Puerto Rico is "sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitution" after the 1952 Compact. 61 Both courts relied on a 1953 First Circuit opinion holding that Congress's use of the word "constitution" meant Congress had given the new government full authority over the island's internal affairs. 62 
B. Entrenching the Compact in Law
Unfortunately, both the First Circuit in Quiñones and the Supreme Court in Examining Board declined to flesh out how Congress could entrench Puerto Rican autonomy with a simple statute rather than a grant of statehood or independence. In general, Anglo-American constitutional law contemplates that last-in-time subconstitutional legislation will be applied over contradictory earlier-in-time subconstitutional legislation. 63 However, there are reasons to think that the case of compacts with subnational units might be different.
First, it is not clear that a compact like the agreement between Puerto Rico and the federal government is normalcourse legislation. The 1952 Compact is comprised of two acts of Congress, which repeal federal laws, not enact new ones; three Puerto Rican referenda; and the Puerto Rican Constitution. Congress did not enact Puerto Rico's constitution to replace the portions of the old Foraker and Jones Acts it had repealed, nor did it assert in the relevant acts that it retained the right to plenary power over the territory. In fact, for reasons unclear, an amendment to Congress's act to ratify the proposed Puerto Rican Constitution reserving that right was defeated. 64 The legislative history makes no such claim either One possibility is that the amendment might have been proper only if offered during the debate over Public Law 600 because it changed the nature of the enabling act itself, not the proposed constitution. At least one congressman objected on the basis that it would be bad faith to change the Compact's basic terms at the ratification stage. 98 CONG. REC. 6184-85 (1952) 81 That year, Congress amended the law, without any mention of the change in any recorded legislative history. 82 The opinions in the case avoided addressing any issues regarding Puerto Rico's constitutional status; conceivably, they might have been written the same way had a law of one of the fifty states been at issue. 83 Notably, the opinions in seems to agree with Justice Breyer's arguments that the 1952 Compact empowered Puerto Rico to "enact and enforce-pursuant to its own powers-its own criminal laws." 136 S. Ct. at 1880 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer's argument is more persuasive when it contends that the standard that Justice Kagan uses to determine the historical source of prosecutorial authority would seem to require that "the Philippines, new States, and the Indian tribes" lack preexisting prosecutorial authority given the federal government's role in authorizing those entities' contemporary sovereignty. See id. at 1878-80. Second, even if the municipal corporations might be able to claim personhood under the Due Process Clause, the rational basis test applied in Harris and Califano is exceedingly deferential; the Supreme Court upheld lower welfare reimbursement levels to Puerto Ricans and the inapplicability of the Supplemental the case did not explicitly argue that the 1952 Compact had been implicitly repealed. 84 Second, even if these political acts constitute functional legislation, there is Anglo-American common law support for the notion that some legislative acts can be entrenched, despite the general principle that "one legislature may not bind the legislative authority of its successors." 85 Supporters of the principle argue, among other things, that entrenchment functions as an end-run around Article V's procedure for constitutional amendments and that it subverts the democratic will of future electorates. 86 Yet while those arguments may very well hold water in response to purportedly entrenched social, economic, or foreign policy legislation, they are less persuasive in response to an attempt to entrench self-government rights for the people of territories. In this case, entrenchment is a proper way for Congress to dispose of the governance of a territory pursuant to the Territories Clause, without giving up its power to preempt local law pursuant to its other enumerated powers and the Supremacy Clause. Most importantly, entrenchment here protects democracy, for it ensures that a change in policy affecting a group cannot be effected without the group's democratic participation.
This limited acceptance of legislative entrenchment has been the norm in the United Kingdom. For example, the Acts of Union for Scotland and Ireland were de facto entrenched. While Parliament amended those laws frequently, it did so generally with the consent of members from those constituent subnational units. 87 passed a law purporting to prevent itself from legislating for its dominions "unless it is expressly declared in that Act that that Dominion has requested, and consented to, the enactment thereof." 88 Puerto Rican officials used this law, the Statute of Westminster, as a model for the 1952 Compact. 89 While recognizing that "in legal theory" Parliament can reverse such a law, the U.K. courts have noted that as a matter of convention "[f]reedom once given cannot be taken away." 90 And when Parliament devolved powers to the Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish legislatures, it did so after both passing legislation and receiving approval via local referenda. 91 The hile, from an orthodox legal-constitutional perspective, guarantees as to the Scottish Parliament's permanence contained in a UK statute would not be worth the paper they were printed on, it should not be taken for granted that that perspective is the right one from which to attempt to gauge the political or legal implications of what is being proposed."). However, while this obtains for the modern assemblies, the Parliament of Northern Ireland-which had been created without a local referendumwas abolished by the U.K. Parliament acting without the consent of the Northern Irish administration and a referendum. Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, 21 Eliz. 2 c. 36.
At the time of this writing, there is some risk that the failure of the unionist and republican parties in the Northern Irish assembly to reach a power-sharing arrangement may result in the reimposition of direct rule from Westminster. legitimacy that Parliament had to tweak the Acts of Union. 92 Moreover, the U.K. experience shows an understanding that when a legislature compacts with subnational units, changes to the compact require the subnational unit to agree via referendum. At the very least, this evidences a constitutional convention in the U.K. against disenfranchising local communities after granting them self-government. This convention ought to be understood as a constitutional command in the United States where it has long been recognized by courts and scholars that attempts to reduce political representation deserve heightened forms of review. 93 Additionally, at least one Framer of the Constitution contemplated that some legislation could entrench itself. James Madison thought legislation including stipulations have an "irrevocable" quality. 94 True, Madison construed this category narrowly-the only example he gave of such legislation was that which created public debt. Some scholars interpret Madison to be primarily concerned about protecting fundamental private property rights. 95 While the right to vote is not a fundamental property right under the Due Process Clause, it is a fundamental right under the Equal Protection Clause. 96 public health and safety. 97 The Puerto Rican government only relies on the federal government for action where the U.S. Constitution provides for the federal government to have sole authority, such as to conduct foreign affairs or regulate interstate commerce. This includes legislating bankruptcy remedies for Puerto Rico, which inevitably interfere with obligations incurred by organizations created by state legislatures. Therefore, the federal Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), which imposed a fiscal oversight board with the power to alter Puerto Rico's economic policies, very well might be constitutional, notwithstanding with this understanding of the 1952 Compact. On the other hand, the extensive authority granted to the Fiscal Control Board under PROMESA far outstrips the authorities delegated to the federal courts under Chapter 11 of the federal Bankruptcy Code and thus may be vulnerable to arguments that PROMESA goes beyond what is necessary to regulate interstate commerce or restructure debts and in fact impermissibly discriminates against a sovereign. 98 All this is not to say that the Compact is unrepealable. Congress can repeal the Compact the same way it enacted it-with the consent of Puerto Ricans.
Moreover, any congressional attempt to legislate for Puerto Rico may run into Political Process doctrine problems. Legislatures may not take away minority groups' power to legislate. 99 Interfering with Puerto Rico's governance would deprive a minority group, Puerto Ricans, of its ability to participate in selfgovernance. Because Puerto Ricans would have no say in Congress's act to strip this power away, such an act should be voided by the courts. Therefore, even if Congress lacked the power to compact with Puerto Rico, by giving them self-governance Congress waived the right to take that power away.
The fact that Congress has never taken away local selfgovernance rights from federal territories might reflect this Political Process doctrine concern. A possible exception might be the shifting balance of authority over the District of Columbia between Congress and the District's municipal government. However, the District of Columbia case can be distinguished from those of Puerto Rico and other overseas U.S. entities on at 97 See P.R. Dep't of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1988).
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See supra note 11 and accompanying text. least two grounds. First, the District of Columbia is governed by the Enclave Clause, 100 which is motivated by different policies than the Territories Clause. 101 These policies include the national government's ability to ensure the capitol's safety so that the government can function. 102 No such concern applies to far-off territories. Thus, there is reason to think that Congress could waive its plenary power over a territory by statute, 103 but not waive its plenary powers over the capitol enclave without a constitutional amendment.
Second, Congress never purported to waive, or implied a purpose of waiving, its right to govern the District of Columbia like Congress did with the 1952 Compact with Puerto Rico. Ever since Congress relocated to the territory on the Potomac ceded by Maryland and Virginia, Congress always maintained, at the very least, explicit veto rights over the acts of the capitol district's local government. 104 Therefore, because Congress never relinquished its plenary power, its governance changes just reframed the process in a non-substantive way: in every scheme inaugurated, Congress has called the shots at the end of the day. 105 
C. Legislative History & Contemporary Evidence of Congress's Intent to Entrench
Furthermore, Puerto Rico deserves the benefits of the bargain it struck with the federal government in the contingent mish-mash of legislation, referenda, and constitutional documents comprising the 1952 Compact. Congress knew the rights Public Law 600 bestowed upon Puerto Rico. The analysis that follows examines the legislative histories of Public Laws 600 and 447. Congressional materials produced during the consideration of both acts demonstrate Congress's desire to bestow autonomy on Puerto Rico. This legislative history "is essential to understanding statutes enacted by Congress" because "the Constitution largely vests Congress with authority to determine its own" law-making procedures and "Congress intends that its work should be understood through its established institutional processes and practices." 106 In the initial House Committee hearings on Public Law 600, the Governor of Puerto Rico agreed that the bill would give Puerto Rico statehood for "practical purposes" but not voting representation. 107 The Governor argued that Congress ought to pass the bill to fight Communist propaganda about purported U.S. imperialism in the Caribbean. 108 By giving Puerto Ricans the power to form their own republican government, as opposed to relying on the federal government's haphazard devolution of powers, the United States would show its commitment to popular sovereignty. 109 At least one congressman on the committee agreed with this rationale. 110 Puerto Rico's first elected governor also supported Public Law 600 on the ground that free association would provide Puerto Rico with domestic sovereignty's benefits without independence's or statehood's political drawbacks. The Governor intended to draw the committee's attention to the bill's provisions requiring the President to certify that the constitution complied with federal law and that Congress approve the constitution. 111 He argued that these provisions ensured Puerto Ricans received full self-governance within the United States, while not encroaching on the sensitive subjects of full statehood or independence. 112 Other writers 113 have argued that the Governor's testimony-"that if the people of Puerto Rico should go crazy, Congress can always get around and legislate again"-indicates that the bill's sponsors did not contemplate self-government changing Puerto Rico's status. 114 Governor's statement's context, responding to a question about Puerto Rico amending its constitution in a manner in which Congress disapproved. 115 In such a case, Puerto Rico-not the federal government-would have breached the terms of the 1952 Compact by acting unilaterally. Thus, Public Law 600's sponsors envisioned a cooperative relationship between Puerto Rico and the federal government. And, as the Governor contemplated, Congress conditionally approved the draft Puerto Rican Constitution, subject to certain changes it desired. 116 The Governor's letter to President Eisenhower after the Compact took effect in 1953 is far more instructive on this point. He noted that "[t]he laws enacted by the Government of the Commonwealth pursuant to the compact cannot be repealed or modified by external authority . . . . Our status and the terms of our association with the United States cannot be changed without our full consent." 117 Critics have also pointed to the Resident Commissioner's assertion at the hearing that Congress may legislate for Puerto Rico "in case of need." 118 But this, in practice, is no different than Congress's ability to pass local emergency relief bills, regulate the conduct of state elections differently, or legalize gambling in some places but not others. Congress's ability to pass laws that affect states differently may be circumscribed by the (both nascent and historically dubious) Equal Sovereignty doctrine, but even that theory would not strike down laws passed in response to a pressing need. 119 Moreover, the House heard testimony from Puerto Rico's representative in Congress that the reason for using the term "compact" was to follow the Northwest Ordinance's precedent. 120 The term "compact" has a long and storied usage in American constitutional history, beginning with the 1620 Mayflower Compact, which established a majoritarian self-government in the Plymouth Colony. 121 Thomas Jefferson in the 115 Id. Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions argued that the Constitution functioned as a compact between the states that the states could withdraw from at any time. 122 While some Southerners relied on this theory as grounds for secession, the Supreme Court has consistently found that the Constitution is not a compact among states, but a delegation of power to the national government from the American people. 123 The Court has cited the Constitution's text, which states that "We the People of the United States . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution," not "We the States." 124 Thus, the Supreme Court declared after the Civil War that the Constitution is "something more than a compact" that might be so easily dissolved. 125 In contrast, parts of the Northwest Ordinance and the 1952 Compact are explicitly styled as compacts between the federal government and the people of territories. The original thirteen states and the people of the Northwest Territories agreed to six compacts in the Northwest Ordinance. 126 Those compacts set out, among other things, requirements for republican forms of government for the territories, protections of "fundamental" rights for territorial residents, and the process by which the Northwest Territories would enter the federal Id. at 51-52. These substantive-rights guarantees and some further republican-government guarantees, however, are set out over six compacts following the prefatory acts. Id. at 52-53. The Northwest Ordinance's compacts should be analyzed separately from the portions of it that serve as organic acts creating the governments of the territories. union as states. 127 Notably, the compacts' rights provisions "promise [d] " that those privileges and immunities conferred upon residents of the Northwest Territories would not be abrogated. 128 Chief among these rights included a ban on slavery 129 -which caused the bindingness of these compacts to be a source of great controversy in the antebellum Supreme Court. 130 Some Justices, such as Chief Justice John Marshall and Justice Henry Baldwin, claimed the Northwest Ordinance amounted to constitutional provisions that states and the federal government could not repeal by mere statutes. 131 No Justice publicly doubted the Northwest Ordinance's constitutional effectiveness as applied to territories; the controversy only existed as to whether the Northwest Ordinance's substantive rights provisions continued to bind territories after statehood. 132 Congress intended a like result here: a binding agreement conferring rights upon Puerto Rico that could not be changed without consent of the governed. 133 Some point out, however, that Public Law 600 was not explicitly styled as a compact but instead was "adopted in the nature of a compact." 134 In the Senate committee hearings for the ratification bill, the committee's legal counsel suggested that Congress retained the ability to unilaterally change Puerto 127 Hegreness, supra note 126, at 1825-27. 128 Id. at 1825.
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Id. at 1842.
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See id. at 1861-73. Rico's status. The Committee Chairman emphasized that Public Law 600 was not a compact, but instead a statute "in the nature of a compact," in response to concerns from some senators that Congress would be giving up all power to legislate for Puerto Rico. 135 But the Chairman never clarified exactly that difference in the hearing transcript and one Senator observed that attempting to make such a distinction "could only lead to complete misunderstanding." 136 The Chairman additionally noted in Public Law 600 that Congress reserved several areas in the Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act and that ratifying the Puerto Rican Constitution would only allow for republican selfgovernment by Public Law 600's terms. 137 His statementsand the committee counsel's advice-ought to be understood as giving committee members assurance that ratification would not give the new Puerto Rican government the authority to ignore all acts of Congress. Given the contemporary renaissance in federalism principles, it would not seem like a senator would need a tutorial in the authority of state and local governments. But in the immediate aftermath of the New Deal, Senator Malone evinced some confusion, stating "I guess we still talk about a State being able to handle its own affairs, too, but most of it is handled right here in Washington . . . . Suppose these internal matters become a question of great interest . . . Do we have any right to go in at all?" The Chairman and an Interior Department official, James Davis, clarified that, just as with states, Congress would retain the power to legislate for the "general" welfare and that the federal courts would be able to enforce federal law in Puerto Rico. 138 The House debate on Public Law 600 included an argument over whether the bill gave Puerto Rico sovereignty. At least one proponent said it gave Puerto Rico partial sovereignty, while the bill's sole opponent claimed that it gave Puerto Rico no actual sovereignty, and that Congress lacked the authority to give partial sovereignty. 139 affairs states have. 141 If true, this implicitly abrogates Congress's plenary powers over the island as powers cannot be said to be plenary if another entity has the power to determine policy. 142 An alternative reading of the legislative history would emphasize the testimony that Public Law 600's sponsors did not intend to change the "political" or "legal" status of Puerto Rico. 143 The problem is that this argument relies on an overbroad reading of these terms. Clearly, the authors did want to change the political and legal status of Puerto Rico by allowing for a popularly drafted constitution. This calls for a constrained understanding of what the sponsors meant by political and legal matters.
Political matters in this context relates to full statehood and corresponding federal political representation. When explaining why the bill provided for no change in political status, Puerto Rico's Resident Commissioner stated, "This is not statehood. Puerto Rico will continue to be represented in Congress by its Resident Commissioner." 144 The legislation's proponents argued that Public Law 600 would make Puerto Rican selfgovernment over local issues a reality-continuing a trend of federal relinquishment of control. 145 Legal matters here refers to the applicability of federal law in Puerto Rico. As noted above, opponents of Public Law 600 were concerned that the Compact would result in independence. Assertions that the island's legal status remained unchanged just reflected the notion that laws passed according to Congress's enumerated powers remained applicable in Puerto Rico. 146 Some also object to finding Congress gave Puerto Rico autonomy by noting that certain Truman Administration officials argued the federal government retained plenary power over Pu- [F]ull authority and responsibility for local self-government will be vested in the people of Puerto Rico. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico will be a government which is truly by the consent of the governed. No government can be invested with a higher dignity and greater worth than one based upon the principle of consent. 150 President Truman's words most accurately reflect the 1952 Compact's purposes: to allow the people of Puerto Rico sovereignty over their own internal affairs. This is essentially the same sovereignty states have, nothing more and nothing less. As Justice Breyer points out in his dissent in Sanchez Valle, the timing of this agreement further lends itself to this interpretation: the United Nations and the international community had been pressuring the United States to provide its territories with self-governance since 1945. 151 cable to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico" because the Amendment's principles seek to protect sovereigns. 158 Other circuits have observed that "Puerto Rican sovereignty is of an extent and character similar to that of the States." 159 Because Puerto Rico is a state-like sovereign, it should have all the legal protections the Constitution guarantees to the states. 160 Federalism, too, is such a protection and it would be overly formalistic to deny Puerto Rico that protection while granting it other constitutional rights on the basis of its functional place in American constitutional government.
Moreover, applying federalism limits would be beneficial to Puerto Rico's relationship with the federal government. First, doing so would emphasize the principle of government by consent at the 1952 Compact's core. Second, federalism protections lessen the democracy gap caused by Puerto Rico's lack of voting rights in federal elections. For example, Congress could not legislate for commerce occurring wholly inside Puerto Rico that lacked substantial interstate effects. 161 And seemingly under the recently-announced Equal Sovereignty doctrine, federal courts can invalidate enactments targeted at Puerto Rico that fail to be related to solving Puerto Rican or national problems. 162 If Congress is cognizant of this check, the input of Puerto Rico's nonvoting representative might be amplified because Congress would seek to avoid passing laws for Puerto Rico destined for invalidation upon judicial review by consulting with the representative. As the Supreme Court has observed, "federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the 158 Ezratty, 648 F.2d at 776 n.7. This comes with the notable caveat of voting for federal offices, but that is a political, not legal, protection of states. This Note contends that legal doctrines intended to protect states are equally applicable to Puerto Rico and its residents. diffusion of sovereign power." 163 The 1952 Compact diffuses sovereignty between Puerto Rico and the federal government, as does the Constitution to the states; Puerto Rico's citizens should benefit from corresponding federalism protections. Furthermore, other federalism constraints on Congress's ability to legislate for Puerto Rico would help protect Puerto Ricans' fundamental freedoms. 164 Essentially, Puerto Rico's status as a free associated state gives it all of the rights and protections of states, except for political representation at the federal level. 165 That the Constitution does not explicitly contemplate this status should be of no great import. Congress's Territories Clause plenary powers should be read as a sort of default rule, one that Congress and subnational entities can contract-or compact-around. One can view the 1952 Compact as an acceptable way for Congress to "dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations" for Puerto Rico. 166 Joseph Story explained that the Framers included the Territories Clause to give Congress latitude in setting up territorial governments. 167 Moreover, the clause was uncontroversial at the Constitutional Convention because all assumed it to merely state the obvious: that the Congress would have sovereignty over territory newly acquired. 168 Chief Justice Marshall observed that "[t]he right to govern[ ] may be the inevitable consequence of the right to acquire territory." 169 If the Framers' intent was to give Congress expansive authority, it does not follow that they would want to prevent Congress from bargaining away self-government rights to the 163 people of the territories. What differentiates Puerto Rico from otherwise similar entities within the constitutional framework such as Guam or the Virgin Islands is that Puerto Rico alone has obtained such a bargain with the federal government. The Supreme Court has implicitly countenanced this possibility. While upholding Congress's authority to amend laws passed by the Dakota territorial legislature, the Court found that the plenary power to legislate for territories exists until Congress grants "sovereignty" away. 170 The Court did not say that this power is retained until Congress confers the full political rights of statehood or independence upon a territory, ergo the virtual sovereignty enjoyed by Puerto Rico should suffice as a grant of sovereignty. 171 Even if one finds the Territories Clause unavailing, functional reasons justify free associated statehood as an acceptable constitutional condition. Beyond the arguments from popular sovereignty made throughout this Part, Puerto Rico's size and cultural differences make free associated statehood appropriate. Puerto Rico has the largest population of the remaining U.S. overseas entities and a larger population than twenty-two states. 172 Moreover, while English predominates in the fifty states, Spanish still dominates in Puerto Rico and the island's population is 99% Hispanic/Latino. 173 Puerto Rico has a distinct identity, as evidenced by the island's participation apart from the United States in international sporting competitions, such as the World Baseball Classic and the Olympics. 174 As a matter of fact, Puerto Rican representation in the Olympics began in 1948-the same time that the movement that culminated in the 1952 Compact got started-even 170 though residents of the then-territories of Alaska and Hawaii participated only as part of the United States team. 175 Moreover, the political distinctness of Puerto Rico from the United States has allowed it to maintain separate squads, a status that the International Olympic Committee has said would end if Puerto Rico received full statehood. 176 All this is not to say the 1952 Compact's arrangement is the best or even the second-best solution for Puerto Rico. It is merely to say that this arrangement is currently the law-and that potentially better options such as independence and statehood are not off the table. In fact, Congress constituted the Philippines as a commonwealth for a ten-year period before granting the Philippines full independence. 177 Under the Philippine Commonwealth, the Philippine people received autonomy over local affairs, while Congress retained power to legislate in extraordinary situations and control over trade and foreign policy. 178 Gaining full independence is no trickier for Puerto Rico than it might have been before 1952 because revising the Compact takes an act of Congress, which was also necessary in the Philippine case. If Puerto Ricans choose full statehood, the constitutional process for obtaining it involves the mutual assent of Congress and the prospective state and thus can be understood as mutual revision of the 1952 Compact. 179 Moreover, the parties to the 1952 Compact can mutually agree to revise the Compact's terms of free associated statehood as well. For example, Puerto Rico one day may want more control over its foreign policy but not the expense of having to maintain a military. It might also want to continue reaping the benefits of U.S. nationality for migration and travel purposes. Changing the terms of free associated statehood would accommodate these and other potential policy changes in a way that full statehood or complete independence would not. 
